ABSTRACT With the rapid growth in the popularity of mobile devices and development of network technologies, various online social networking applications have grown in popularity. While these social networking sites provide benefits in terms of enhanced connectivity with people all around the world, they can also pose security threats and raise privacy concerns due to their vulnerability to be exploited by malicious agents. Such social networking sites where members can transmit or share their social information via public channels increase the risk that these information may be exposed to unwanted users. Therefore, it is important to enhance the security of these online social network services using group session keys. These group session keys also need to be updated in case a new member joins the group or an old member leaves the social group. To enhance the trustworthiness of the online social network systems, in this paper, we propose a secure chaotic maps-based group key agreement scheme. In this proposed scheme, we also provide member anonymity to ensure the privacy of the communication between the social networking platform and the members. The proposed solution does not rely on a centralized online key center or a trusted group chairman, thus ensuring fairness. We integrate the mechanisms of message encryption and member verification into the scheme to allow the members to anonymously interact with the services of the online social network. We verify the formal security of the proposed solution using the widely accepted BAN logic analysis and simulation verification with Proverif to prove that our scheme is secure against both passive and active attacks. We also demonstrate that the proposed scheme is efficient in its implementation and achieves greater functionality criteria in comparison with similar existing proposals.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fast growing popularity of Internet technologies has opened up new ways for people to connect. This has led to the growth of online social networks (OSNs) which aim to create and foster social connections between people and their interests. As shown in Fig. 1 , we are surrounded by different online social networks which serve different purposes and target different user groups. Social networking sites such as BeeTalk [3] and Paktor [27] are used exclusively for dating while LINE [23] and WeChat [36] are popular for making friends and staying connected. Social networks such as Facebook [9] , Twitter [31] and Google+ [10] while mostly are used for sharing life-experiences, have also started affecting how people and organizations do business.
Online social networks are ever-growing in popularity and provide several useful functionalities such as the ability to exchange messages, share content, and disseminate information among social users. However, often they contain people's personal profiles (including addresses, photographs) and sensitive information. This data must be protected to prevent it's access by unwanted entities. There is also the external threat of security attacks on these online social networks which can compromise their user data. Therefore, preservation of privacy while disseminating social network data is an important and urgent concern which needs to be addressed. Since online social networks contain and transmit user's personal and sensitive data, encryption of this data and authentication of it's members are crucial needs of OSNs.
Technologies such as group key agreement are helpful for establishing common session keys to protect sensitive social data being shared in specific groups from being spied on by illegitimate social members or external entities. In this paper, we develop a secure group key agreement scheme using extended chaotic maps, where only participating members of a social group can construct the group session key without the help of a trusted key center or a centralized key distributor. Similar to existing group communication systems, this proposed scheme for online social networks is designed to fulfill certain security goals.
A. SECURITY GOALS OF ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
In this subsection, we briefly describe the essential criteria that a secure online social network system should satisfy. The requirements are as follows:
• Member verification: On a secure online social networking system, every member should be able to confirm that all participants in a social group have been securely verified. This is to ensure that only legitimate members of the social networking group can send messages to other members of the social group.
• Group identification: In real social networking systems, a member may join different online social groups. Therefore, it is essential that a member is able to clearly identify the social group from where the received message originated.
• Privacy preservation: A secure social networking system must ensure that the real identities of it's social members are masked. Even if a malicious attacker is able to eavesdrop on the messages being transmitted between a member and a group, the attacker should not be able to connect the transmitted messages to the real identity of the member.
• Security in social group communication: To ensure the privacy and security of the communication within a social group, there is a need to construct a common group session key shared among all legitimate members of the social group. This should be done without the help of any third party and the key should be kept secret from all external unwanted parties.
• Fairness in group key establishment: For a group key establishment scheme, no single entity should control the generation of the group session key. To ensure the fairness in the process of establishment of the group session key, the final group session key should contain equal contributions from all the members in the social group.
• Dynamic group key management: When a new social member joins a social group or an old social member leaves the social group, the group key should be updated securely. The mechanism to generate the new key should prevent new members from accessing previous data and old members from accessing future data of the social group.
• System efficiency: A secure social network system would be called efficient if it has a low communication overhead and computational complexity during the group key establishment phase.
B. RELATED WORKS FOR GROUP KEY ESTABLISHMENT
Group key establishment is the process which enables a group of members to establish a common group key. This is helpful for sending and exchanging sensitive messages among all legitimate members of the group. In general there are two types of group key establishment schemes: 1) group key distribution scheme [17] , [25] , [33] and 2) group key agreement scheme [8] , [13] - [15] , [32] , [34] , [41] - [43] . In the group key distribution scheme, a trusted key center or a centralized key distributor is responsible for generating the group key and securely distributing it to all the group members. In the group group key agreement scheme, the participants establish the group key without the help of a trusted key center or a centralized key distributor. In recent years, several centralized group key management schemes [1] , [17] , [18] , [25] , [28] - [30] , [33] , [35] , [37] , [39] have been proposed in the literature. In 2000, Steiner et al. [30] proposed a key management scheme for dynamic peer groups based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme. However, Steiner et al.'s scheme [30] is not suitable for large groups. Subsequently, Wong et al. [37] proposed a multicast key management system based on key graphs to solve the scalability problem of Steiner et al. However, their scheme suffered from high computational costs. In 2003, Sherman and McGrew proposed a key establishment scheme [28] based on one-way function trees for handling large dynamic groups. In 2006, Wang and Laih used a technique called merging to propose a timebound hierarchical key assignment scheme [35] , which greatly reduced the communication and storage requirements of Wang et al.'s scheme. In 2008, Xu and Huang [39] proposed a multicast key distribution scheme which used maximum distance separable codes to reduce the computational complexity of the key generation process. In 2010, Je et al. [18] proposed an efficient key tree management scheme which examined the resource information of each group member's device to reduce the computational complexity and storage costs of their scheme.
In 2013 and 2016, Lou et al. [25] and Jaiswal and Tripathi [17] individually proposed different implementations of the group key distribution schemes based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [20] . Both their implementations involved selecting a chairman or an initiator to distribute information related to the group key to all other participants of the group. In 2014, Vijayakumar et al. [33] further proposed a new centralized group key management based on the Chinese remainder theorem called CRTGKM algorithm. At the serverside, the computational complexity of this algorithm is O (1) for the case when a member joins or leaves the multicast group. At the group member side, this computational complexity is minimized and a multicast group member performs only a single modulo division operation.
There are several other works of research which have focussed on how to design authenticated group key agreement schemes [8] , [41] - [43] . In 2006, Dutta and Barua [8] proposed a password-based encrypted group key agreement scheme. The security of their scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and a cryptographically secure one-way hash function. In 2009, Zheng et al. [42] proposed an efficient password-based group key agreement scheme with resistance to dictionary attacks. Their scheme has proven to be secure against online and off-line dictionary attacks under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption for both the ideal cipher model and the random oracle model. In 2010, Zhao et al. [41] proposed an efficient fault-tolerant group key agreement scheme which not only assures that all illegitimate participants are excluded from the group but also ensures efficiency when compared with other fault-tolerant group key agreement schemes. More recently, in 2016, Zhu introduced a multi-party authenticated group key agreement and privacy preserving scheme [43] based on the Chebyshev chaotic maps [26] and a pair of secure symmetric encryption and decryption functions. Zhu's scheme is secure against various security attacks such as replay, impersonation, man-in-the-middle and key compromise. Moreover, Zhu extended the proposed scheme to high level security attributes such as privacy preservation, mutual and group authentication, perfect forward secrecy and fairness in group key establishment.
C. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we put forward a secure and efficient group key agreement and privacy preservation scheme based on extended chaotic maps. The main contributions of this paper are listed below:
• Our proposed solution does not need to adopt a centralized online key center or a group chairman to distribute the group session key. We also suggest a fairness mechanism for balancing the computation and communication overheads among the members.
• Once a member leaves the social group or a new member joins the social group, all legal members of the group can prove the validity of the group session key with only a single communication round for each session.
• In practical applications of online social networks, a social member may join multiple social groups. Our proposed scheme introduces a group identification method for enhancing the efficiency of identification of the online social network system.
• To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first attempt to provide a chaotic maps-based group key agreement scheme for online social networks. The proposed scheme is provably secure in the BAN logic model under the chaotic-based decisional DiffieHellman (CDDH) and the chaotic-based computational Diffie-Hellman (CCDH) problems.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we present some preliminaries of this paper. In Section 3 we propose the new group key agreement and privacy preservation scheme for online social network systems. The new, informal and formal security proofs of the proposed scheme are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we present the performance analysis and functionality comparisons of the proposed scheme with other related schemes. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 7.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Before proposing the chaotic map scheme, in this section we introduce the concepts of the Chebyshev chaotic maps [4] , [26] , and the decisional discrete logarithm (DDL) and the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problems used in our proposed scheme. The Chebyshev polynomial T n (x) is a polynomial in x of degree n, where x is a variable with value lying in the interval [-1, 1] and n is an integer. The Chebyshev
and the recurrence relation of Chebyshev polynomial is defined as:
where T 0 (x) = 1, T 1 (x) = x and cos(x) and arccos(x) are the trigonometric functions. They are defined as cos :
We give some examples of Chebyshev polynomials as follows:
The Chebyshev polynomials have two important properties [11] , [21] , [24] , namely: the semigroup property and the chaotic property.
(1) The semigroup property:
where r and s are two positive integers and
The chaotic property: When the degree n > 1, the Chebyshev polyno-
for the positive Lyapunov exponent λ = ln n > 0. Zhang [40] proved that in the interval (−∞, +∞), the semigroup property holds for Chebyshev polynomials. This can enhance the property as follows:
where n ≥ 2, x ∈ (−∞, +∞) and p is a large prime. We can state that
The semigroup property also holds in this case, and the enhanced Chebyshev polynomials still satisfy the commutative property under composition.
Based on two well-known Diffie-Hellman problems which are assumed to be difficult to solve within polynomial time, the Chebyshev polynomial also meets the following problems [7] , [12] , [22] , [43] .
(1) The chaotic maps-based discrete logarithm problem (CMBDLP): Given two elements x and y, it is intractable to find the integer r, such that T r (x) mod p = y.
The chaotic maps-based Diffie-Hellman problem (CMBDHP): Given three elements x, T r (x) mod p and T s (x) mod p, it is intractable to compute the value T rs (x) mod p.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
We assume that a set of n members M = {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M n } of a social group G i wants to securely communicate and share sensitive data in the group. Each member M i needs to maintain a private/public key pair (S i , PK i ) such that
where p is a large prime number and x ∈ Z p is a random number generated and published by a trusted authority TA. The long term private/public key pair of M i is authenticated by the TA with it's corresponding certificate. Additionally, each member M i needs to maintain his or her identity ID i , a chaotic maps-based one-way hash function H (.), a random number generator, and a pair of symmetric encryption/decryption functions
with the key K . The notations used throughout the paper are shown in Table 1 .
The proposed scheme consists of five phases, namely: A) the social group establishment phase, B) the predecessor and successor authentication phase, C) the group key agreement phase, D) the social member withdrawal phase, E) and social member joining phase. We describe the details of these phases as below:
A. SOCIAL GROUP ESTABLISHMENT PHASE Let us suppose that the initiator of the social group would like to invite a set of n members to participate in the specific social group. He/she submits a request for the establishment of the social group with a list of the identities of all the participants to the OSN via a secure channel. Here, we assume that M = {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M n } is the set of n members in that particular social group and all social members
. . , M n are organized as an ordered chain, and M 1 is the initiator of the social group. After receiving the request from M 1 , the OSN creates a social group and generates a unique identity GID i for M . Then the OSN multicasts the {GID i , ID member } to M via a secure channel
B. PREDECESSOR AND SUCCESSOR AUTHENTICATION PHASE
In this phase, we define the M i−1 as the predecessor of M i and M i+1 as the successor of M i . In addition, all ID information and their corresponding public keys are arranged and all the social members perform the following steps:
Step 1.M i chooses a random number r i ∈ [1, p + 1]
and computes
Step 2.Upon receiving the message from 
Step 3.Upon receiving the message from M i+1 , M i computes the values of 
. If the two sides of the equation are not equivalent, the authentication fails and the session is terminated by
and takes SK i,i+1 as the common session key shared between M i and M i+1 . To achieve the property of mutual authentication, M i sends MAC i to its successor M i+1 .
Step 4.Upon receiving the response MAC i from its predecessor, M i+1 judges whether
If not, the authentication fails and the session is terminated by M i+1 . Otherwise, M i+1 takes SK i,i+1 as the common session key shared between M i+1 and M i . Note that the above-mentioned steps can be executed simultaneously. Thus, each social member M i can establish two common session keys SK i,i+1 and SK i−1,i with its successor M i+1 and predecessor M i−1 , respectively. Here, M 1 establishes two session keys SK 1,2 and SK n,1 with its successor M 2 and its predecessor M n . M n establishes two session keys SK n,1 and SK n−1,n with its successor M 1 and its predecessor M n−1 . The details of this phase are depicted in Fig. 2 .
C. GROUP KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
In this phase, each social member M i of GID i computes the value of
and multicasts X i to the social group G i . We can see the value of B i in Table 2 computing X 2 ⊕ B 1 , where 
D. SOCIAL MEMBER WITHDRAWAL PHASE
In case a social member M j withdraws from the social group, the member set M will have (n − 1) remaining members, where
To secure further communications, and prevent the member who has exited the group from accessing the content of the group, all the remaining social members must update the group key. In the design of our scheme, M j+1 is the new successor of M j−1 and only two members recomputing the protocol presented in Section 3.2. Note that
E. SOCIAL MEMBER JOINING PHASE
In case a new social member is authorized to join the social group which has an existing size of n, the size of the new set M " will change to (n + 1) members, and
Thus the new social member M n+1 will become the successor of the member M n and the member M 1 will become the successor of the member M n+1 . In the design of our scheme, only three members M n , M n+1 and M 1 must generate two new session keys SK n,n+1 and SK n+1,1 , one session key being shared between M n and M n+1 and the other between M n+1 and M 1 . As a result, M n will VOLUME 6, 2018 need to send a new message {C n , T r n (x) mod p, MAC n } to its new successor M n+1 . The new member M n+1 will in turn need to send the message {C n+1 , T r n+1 (x) mod p, MAC n+1 } to its new successor M 1 . Then M n+1 will verify the validity of the message {C n , T r n (x) mod p, MAC n } and compute the new session key SK n,n+1 shared between M n+1 and its new predecessor M n . Similarly, the first social member M 1 will update its new session key with SK n+1, 1 . Finally, all the (n+1) social members in GID i will obtain a new group session key by recomputing the protocol of Section 3.2. Note that ID member = (ID 1 ||ID 2 || . . . ||ID n ||ID n+1 ).
IV. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
According to the security goals mentioned in Section 1.1, in this section we provide an informal analysis of the security properties of our proposed scheme.
A. PROVISION OF SOCIAL GROUP IDENTIFICATION
When a social member M i joins different online social groups on the social network platform, it is essential to help M i identify the correct source of each received message. In order to facilitate this property, during the member authentication and group key agreement phases of our proposed scheme, the group identity GID i is embedded in the transmitted messages which ensures a high rate of efficiency in the authentication procedures.
B. PROVISION OF PRIVACY PRESERVATION
Based on the design of our proposed scheme, the original identity ID i of the member M i is masked during the communications with social members over public channels. Therefore, any malicious outsider M E who attempts to eavesdrop on the communication cannot launch security attacks to compromise M i 's real identity ID i . During the predecessor and successor authentication phase, M i 's real identity is shared via the encrypted message
. Therefore, without the knowledge of r i , the malicious outsider M E cannot obtain the ids ID i and ID i+1 . Moreover, untraceability is ensured by the participating member since a random number is always changed for each authentication request. In the proposed scheme, all the identities of the members of the social group are always transmitted in cipher format instead of plaintext to guarantee the privacy and security of the members of the OSN.
C. PROVISION OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND MEMBER VERIFICATION
In the predecessor and successor authentication phase of our proposed scheme, after receiving the message {C i , T r i (x) mod p, MAC i }, the member M i+1 is allowed to authentication the member M i by means of the equivalence relation (i = 1, . . . , n) checks for the equality
If the left-hand side (LHS) of the equation does not equal zero (the right-hand side (RHS)) then an error symbol ⊥ is outputted and the group session key GSK i is invalidated. If the LHS and RHS match, then the condition that the group session key GSK i is authentic is satisfied.
D. PROVISION OF FAIRNESS IN GROUP KEY ESTABLISHMENT
As shown in the predecessor and successor authentication phase, the members M i and M i+1 randomly select their contributions T r i (x) mod p and T r i+1 (x) mod p, respectively. Then M i and M i+1 exchange them over a public channel and agree on the common secret value SK i,i+1 . As shown in the group key agreement phase, each social member M i of the group GID i individually computes his or her parameter B i . The group session key GSK i = H (B 1 ||B 2 || . . . ||B n ) contains equal contributions from every participating member M i (i = 1, . . . , n). Therefore, in the proposed scheme, the fairness of the group key establishment process is ensured without the help of any third party trusted key center or centralized key distributor.
E. PROVISION OF GROUP KEY UPDATE
When a new member wants to join a social group or an existing member wants to withdraw from the group, the scheme should successfully prevent the withdrawing member from accessing newer group data, and the joiing member from accessing existing old data in the group. In the withdrawal phase of our proposed scheme, only M j−1 and M j+1 need to compute the new secret value SK j−1,j+1 . After that, M j is excluded from the social group and any existing member M i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n, i = j) of M can update and verify the validity of the new group session key for future use. Similarly, in the social member joining phase of our proposed scheme, only M n , M n+1 and M 1 need to compute the new secret values SK n,n+1 and SK n+1,1 . Afterwards, the new member M n+1 is included in the group and each member M i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n + 1) of M " can generate the new group session key for future use. In this wayour proposed scheme provides the property of dynamic group key management.
V. FORMAL SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we present the proof of the security of all the proposed phases in our scheme using the BAN logic [2] .
A. SECURITY OF AUTHENTICATION PHASE
In this subsection, we demonstrate that a member M i and a member M i+1 can achieve mutual authentication using a shared key SK i,i+1 . First, some notations and rules to describe the BAN logic are provided as follows:
1) NOTATIONS 1) P |≡ X : P believes X also called P would be entitled to believe X . In particular, P may act as though X is true. 2) P X : P sees X . Someone has sent a message containing X to P and P can read and repeat X . 3) P |∼ X : P once said X . P sent a message including X at some time. Note that P does not know whether the message was sent long ago or during the current iteration of the protocol, but P knows that P |≡ X when the message was sent. 4) P |⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over X . P controls X which is subject to the jurisdiction of P and P is trusted for X . 5) (X ): X is fresh. X has not been sent in a message at any time before the execution of current iteration of the protocol. 6) P K ←→ Q: P and Q may use the shared key K to communicate securely. We say that K is good, if K can never be discovered by any other participant except P or Q, or a participant trusted by either P or Q. 7) {X } K : The formula X is encrypted under a key K .
2) RULES

1) Message meaning rule:
It means that if P believes that K is a key shared with Q and P sees X encrypted using K , then P believes that Q once said X .
2) Nonce verification rule:
It means that if P believes that X is fresh and Q once said X , then P believes that Q believes X .
3) Jurisdiction rule: P |≡ Q |⇒ X , P |≡ Q |≡ X P |≡ X . It means that if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X and also believes that Q believes X , then P believes X .
4) Belief rule:
P |≡ Q |≡ (X , Y ) P |≡ Q |≡ X . It means that if P believes that Q believes (X , Y ) then P believes that Q believes X .
3) GOALS
We want to show that the authentication phase in our scheme should achieve the following goals:
←→ M i+1 ).
4) IDEALIZATION OF THE COMMUNICATION MESSAGES
Here, we idealize the communication messages of the authentication phase using the scheme listed as below:
5) INITIAL ASSUMPTIONS
We define some initial assumptions for our scheme as under:
. A 1 and A 2 indicate that the members M i and M i+1 generate their own private keys as S i and S i+1 . Hence, we assume that they are fresh. Therefore, according to A 1 and A 2 , A 3 and A 4 are reasonable.
6) DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Based on the rules of the BAN logic, we prove that our scheme can achieve the defined goals using the initial assumptions.
As per the message meaning rule, using S 1 and S 2 , we can obtain S 3 : M i | ≡ M i+1 |∼ T r i+1 (x). As per the nonce verification rule, using M i |≡ (T r i+1 (x)) and S 3 , we can obtain S 4 : M i |≡ M i+1 |≡ T r i+1 (x). According to the jurisdiction rule, by using M i |≡ M i+1 |⇒ T r i+1 (x) from Message 2 and S 4 , we can obtain
Since K i,i+1 = T r i T S i+1 (x), using Message 1 and A 4 , we can
. As per the message meaning rule, using S 5 and S 6 , we can obtain S 7 : M i+1 |≡ M i | ∼ T r i (x). As per the nonce verification rule, using M i+1 | ≡ (T r i (x)) and S 7 we obtain S 8 :
As per the jurisdiction rule, by using M i+1 |≡ M i |⇒ T r i (x) from Message 1 and S 8 we obtain M i+1 |≡ T r i (x). Since
c: FOR THE GOAL 3
We also have
←→ M i+1 ) from goal 1 and S 10 : M i {MAC i+1 } SK i,i+1 from Message 2 . As per the message meaning rule, using S 9 and S 10 , we can obtain ←→ M i+1 ).
B. SECURITY OF GROUP KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
Passive attack is a well known technique of attack for compromising the group key agreement scheme. A passive attacker is a passive adversary who cannot compute the group key by eavesdropping on the transmitted messages over a public channel. In this subsection, we show that our scheme is secure against passive attacks.
Theorem 1: Under the Chaotic-based decisional DiffieHellman (CDDH) problem, the proposed group key agreement scheme is secure against passive attacks.
Proof: Suppose that there is an adversary A who wants to obtain the information about the group session key by eavesdropping on the transmitted messages over a public channel. Then, we assume that A may obtain all transmitted messages (GID i , ID member ,
Here, we show that our scheme prevents A from obtaining any information about the group session key GSK i = H (B 1 ||B 2 || · · · ||B n ). Under the CDDH problem, we prove that two tuples T 1 = T S 1 (x), . . . , T S n (x), T r 1 (x), . . . , T r n (x), X 1 , . . . , X n , GSK i and T 2 = T S 1 (x), . . . , T S n (x), T r 1 (x), . . . , T r n (x), X 1 , . . . , X n , R 1 are computationally indistinguishable, where R 1 ∈ Z p . Using the contradiction proof, let us assume that the adversary A can efficiently distinguish between T 1 and T 2 within polynomial-time. Then, we can construct an algorithm A that can efficiently distinguish a chaotic-based decision Diffie-Hellman (CDDH) problem
Without loss of generality, we set T S 1 (x) = T a (x) and T S 2 (x) = T b (x) as the input of A and execute the following steps:
and
Finally, A constructs all the values of T S 1 (x), . . . , T S n (x), T r 1 (x), . . . , T r n (x), X 1 , . . . , X n , R 1 = H (H (GID i ⊕ ID member ⊕ SK 1,2 ⊕ R 2 )||B 2 || · · · ||B n ) and sends them to A. A can determine whether GSK i is equal to R 1 . If it is true, it means that R 2 = T ab (x) mod p. Thus, the assumption that A can run A as a subroutine to efficiently distinguish between the two tuples (T a (x), T b (x), T ab (x) mod p) and (T a (x), T b (x), R 2 ∈ Z p ), is a contradiction.
C. SECURITY OF MEMBER JOINING/WITHDRAWAL PHASE
Forward secrecy is an important security property for the group key agreement scheme. Forward secrecy is defined as the feature that a newly joined group member cannot compute the previous group session keys. Using a similar argument, backward secrecy is defined as the feature that a withdrawn member cannot compute further group session keys. In this subsection, we show that our scheme provides forward and backward secrecies.
Theorem 2: Under the Chaotic-based computational Diffie-Hellman (CCDH) problem, the proposed group key agreement scheme provides forward secrecy for members joining and backward secrecy for member withdrawing from the group.
Proof: Assume that a new member M n+1 joins the group and has obtained a previous transcript GID i , ID member , T S 1 (x), . . . , T S n (x), T r 1 (x), . . . , T r n (x), X 1 , . . . , X n , where X i = B i−1 ⊕ B i . Now, we show that M n+1 cannot compute the previous group session key GSK i = H (B 1 ||B 2 || · · · ||B n ).
Under the CDDH problem, M n+1 cannot compute SK j,j+1 = T r j T r j+1 (x) = T r j r j+1 (x) and T S j T S j+1 (x) = T S j S j+1 (x) for some j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Thus, M n+1 can never recover B j = H (GID i ⊕ ID member ⊕ SK j,j+1 ⊕ T S j T S j+1 (x)). Note that if M n+1 can recover B j , then all B i can be recovered by X 1 , . . . , X n . In other words, our proposed group key agreement scheme provides forward secrecy for members joining a group.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the member M n leaves the group. Now, we show that M n cannot compute further group session keys GSK i = H (B 1 ||B 2 || · · · ||B n−1 ) even if M n eavesdrops on the further transmitted messages GID i , ID member , T S 1 (x), . . . , T S n−1 (x), T r 1 (x), . . . , T r n−1 (x), X 1 , . . . , X n−1 . Using a similar argument mentioned above, we can state that M n cannot compute GSK i . It means that our scheme provides backward secrecy for member leaving the group.
VI. SIMULATION VERIFICATION WITH PROVERIF
Proverif is an automatic cryptographic protocol verifier, which is widely used for specifying and analyzing the security of authenticated key agreement protocols [5] , [6] , [19] . In this section, we utilize Proverif to further analyze the security and validity of the proposed protocol. The whole simulation contains the following procedures:
• First, a public channel ch is defined for the communications. SK ij and SK ji are the session keys generated by the users. Then comes the functions, rules and queries (Fig. 4) . • The process of user S i . (Fig. 5) . • The process of user S j (Fig. 6 ).
• The main execution. (Fig. 7) .
• The result of the proposed protocol. From the results, we can conclude that any two users S i and S j can securely generate a common session key SK ij (Fig. 8) .
Consequently, all group members can calculate a group key GSK .
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS
In this section, we provide a performance analysis of our proposed scheme. First, we define some cryptographic notations and list the computational costs of our proposed system in Table 3 . According to the experimental results performed in [16] with specifications as CPU: 2.4 GHz Intel core i5, RAM: 4.0 GB, using a GNU with multiple precision library and OpenSSL library. The average time of execution for one T Hash , one T Che and one T Sym are 0.02 ms, 32.9 ms and 0.042 ms, respectively. As seen in Table 3 , the computation tasks for each member includes 10 Chebyshev polynomial operations, 4 symmetric encryption/decryption operations and 11 one-way hashing operations. Among these, the Chebyshev polynomial operations are undoubtedly the most time-consuming task. Compared with the solutions of RSA and ECC, the solution provided by extended chaotic maps, not only offers faster computations and smaller key sizes but also reduces the memory usage and bandwidth consumption. The proposed solution does not use time consuming modular exponential computations and scalar multiplications on elliptic curves. Therefore, we can conclude that the intensity of the real-time computation in our proposed scheme is quite acceptable for OSN systems.
In Table 4 , we present a number of security requirements as well as functionality criteria to compare our proposed scheme with related existing schemes [17] , [25] , [33] , [41] . From Table 4 we can observe that none of the schemes can provide formal security proof, fairness in group key establishment and group identification properties in OSN systems. In contrast with related schemes, if a social member M i joins numerous different online social groups, the proposed scheme uses GID i to identify the source of the received message and performs group identification. On the other hand, in our proposed scheme, the generation of the final group session key GSK i contains equal contributions from n social members in M = {M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M n } without the help of a chairman of group or an online key center, thus ensuring fairness in the group key agreement scheme. From Tables 3 and 4 , we can demonstrate that the proposed scheme is efficient and robust for OSN systems in terms of computational overhead and security strength.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a provably secure group key agreement scheme for OSN environments. Using the proposed scheme, a social group in a social networking platform generates a dynamic group session key by exchanging some authentication parameters among it's validated social members. The proposed scheme is based on the extended chaotic maps-based cryptographic model and is energy-efficient and supports anonymous interactions with high security and low computational costs. To prove the strength of it's security, we verified our scheme using the BAN logic analysis. The results of the analysis confirm that the proposed scheme is robust against both passive and active attacks. Therefore, we can conclude that the overall security, functionality and efficiency of our scheme makes it suitable for use in web-based OSNs. 
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